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Traditionally, claims of medical malpractice have been resolved through
tort-based litigation. 1 However, tort-based litigation has received much
criticism as a method for resolving medical malpractice disputes. Critics point
to a number of problems, including the high emotional and financial costs to
the litigants, the detrimental effect on the doctor-patient relationship, and the
inability of tort litigation to deter physician negligence. In response to these
problems, states have instituted some ill-conceived reforms, including tort
reform legislation and poorly-planned alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
schemes. Some commentators have advocated abandoning the current system
entirely in favor of new theories of recovery.
This Note argues that many of the. problems of medical malpractice
litigation can be alleviated through the simple use of mediation as a first step
in the medical malpractice dispute process. This relatively innocuous reform
could improve the access of injured patients to compensation, restore a sense
of fairness to medical malpractice proceedings, and improve quality of care
by encouraging open communication between doctors and patients.
Additionally, a major overhaul of the current system would simply not be
necessary. Part II of this Note reviews the current medical malpractice tort
system and concludes, in agreement with the bulk of the literature, that the
tort litigation system neither remedies injured patients nor effectively serves
any useful public policy. Part I analyzes various attempts to address the
problems of medical malpractice litigation and suggests that most of these
attempts are ill conceived. Part IV describes the mediation process and the
theoretical benefits of mediation in a medical malpractice dispute. Part V
analyzes two empirical studies that strongly suggest that mediation can
effectively resolve medical malpractice disputes. Finally, Part VI concludes
that many of the problems with the current medical malpractice litigation
1 Evidence of the medical malpractice tort case can be found as early as fourteenth-
century England and late nineteenth-century America. See BARRY R. FuRRow ET AL.,
HEALTH LAW: CAsEs, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 308 (3d ed. 1997).
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system could be alleviated with the simple use of mediation as a first step in
the dispute resolution process.
II. THE CURRENT MEDICAL MALPRACTICE SYSTEM
A. Criticism of the Current System
Advocacy of a new system to resolve medical malpractice disputes
necessarily assumes that the current system is flawed. An ideal medical
malpractice dispute resolution system should provide compensation for
patients injured through medical negligence, provide an incentive for doctors
and hospitals to reduce medical negligence, preserve the doctor-patient
relationship whenever possible, and optimize cost efficiency. However, the
current tort-based litigation system for medical malpractice wholly fails to
meet these standards. 2 For example, a recent study concluded that there are
more than 180,000 deaths or serious injuries caused by the negligence of
physicians and hospitals each year in the United States. 3 However, probably
only one to ten percent of the patients involved in occurrences of negligence
actually file malpractice lawsuits.4 These statistics highlight one of the glaring
failings of the current system-that injured patients simply are not
compensated.
Contributing to the problem of medical malpractice litigation is the
emergence of managed care. Patients in managed care systems are more likely
to be dissatisfied with their health care than patients who use the traditional
fee-for-service system.5 Accordingly, patients in managed care plans are
probably more likely to claim malpractice than patients who have the freedom
to choose their doctors.
2 See, e.g., William M. Sage, Enterprise Liability and the Emerging Managed Health
Care System, 60 LAW & CONTEmp. PROBs., Spring 1997, at 160.
3 See PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 12 (1991).
4 See PAnuCiA DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EvIDENCE, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 10 (1985); A. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and
Adverse Events Due to Negligence: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study I1X, 325
NEW ENG. J. MED. 245, 248 (1991).
5 A recent study of over 10,000 patients revealed that patients who chose their doctors
were up to 20% more likely to rate their health care as "very good" or "excellent" than
patients who were assigned doctors. See Julie Schmittdiel et al., Choice of a Personal
Physician and Patient Satisfaction in a Health Maintenance Organization, 278 JAMA
1596, 1596 (1997).
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B. Specific Problems with Litigating Medical Malpractice
1. Cost
As a method for resolving disputes between doctors and patients, litigation
presents a multitude of problems. 6 First, the cost of resolving a medical
malpractice dispute, which may be measured in terms of transaction costs,
parties' overall satisfaction with the resolution process, the effect on the
doctor-patient relationship, and the finality of the resolution,7 is very high in
litigation. Transaction costs include attorneys' fees, time lost, and emotions
spent. 8 Both doctors and patients suffer high transaction costs in medical
malpractice litigation. 9
Another factor that is relevant to the overall cost of resolving medical
malpractice disputes is the satisfaction of the parties with the resolution
process.' 0 Parties are generally satisfied with a resolution process if they feel
that it is fair. Fairness, in turn, depends on the opportunity a party has to
express himself, the amount of participation a party has in shaping a
settlement, and the ability a party has to control final decisions.11 Litigation,
6 Many of the problems to be discussed are endemic to litigation in general, but these
problems are often exacerbated in the context of a medical malpractice dispute.
7 See James W. Reeves, ADR Relieves Pain of Health Care Disputes, 49 DisP. REsOL.
J., Sept. 1994, at 15.
8 See id.
9 Because medical malpractice lawsuits commonly last months, if not years, the
financial burdens on the patient can be considerable. See id. at 16. Injured patients seldom
have the financial resources to pursue an extended court battle in the first place, and even
when they do, they will probably lose significant time at work. See id. at 15-16. With
regard to emotions, a patient suffers through an extended examination of his personal health
matters, and he lives with the dispute for years while awaiting compensation. See id. at 15.
Doctors also incur high transaction costs in litigation. Even though doctors generally
carry malpractice insurance, a lawsuit can keep a doctor away from her practice, where
bills are mounting and opportunities are being lost. See id. at 16. The emotional cost to
doctors in litigation is also very high. Nothing is more humiliating, painful, or
embarrassing for a doctor than to be accused of negligently hurting a patient. See id. A
victory in court probably does little to alleviate this emotional pain. The mere accusation
of malpractice can have an adverse effect on a doctor's reputation among her colleagues
and her credibility with the community. See id.
10 See id. at 15.
11 See id.
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by its nature, generally does not allow parties to experience these factors of
fairness. 12
A third factor to consider when measuring the cost of resolving a medical
malpractice dispute is the effect the resolution process has on the relationship
between the doctor and the patient. 13 Litigation virtually destroys this
relationship. 14 Finally, litigation is inherently poor at conclusively resolving
issues. Verdicts can be appealed, extending the pain of conflict. Even if there
is no appeal, parties to medical malpractice litigation may not believe that the
"real" issues have been resolved. 15
2. Failure to Deter Negligent Conduct or Improve Quality of Care
Another criticism of the current system is that tort-based litigation does
not effectively deter negligent conduct by physicians.' 6 Tort litigation fails in
this respect for both theoretical and practical reasons. First, the economic
theory of torts simply does not apply to medical malpractice. Learned Hand's
famous formula applies best to situations in which negligent conduct is easily
identifiable and correctable. 17 However, health care treatment decisions are
12 'Me factors of fairness are not realized in litigation because litigation is adversarial
in nature and inevitably yields a "winner" and a "loser." See id. at 16. Litigation is
controlled by attorneys, who constantly try to outmaneuver the opposition. See id.
Additionally, parties to litigation tend not to have as substantial a voice in settlement
negotiations as attorneys, whose primary motivation is to put their clients in the best
economic position, rather than the best psychological position. Finally, parties to litigation
have little or no control over final decisions, which are made by attorneys, juries, or a
judge. See id.
13 See id.
14 A doctor considers a malpractice lawsuit to be an attack on her personal character
and her professional competency. See id. at 18. In addition, a patient would not be filing
a lawsuit unless he felt that the doctor had betrayed him. Unfortunately, even if the doctor
and the patient have enjoyed a friendly, long-term relationship and actually harbor no ill-
will toward one another, litigation forces them to become enemies at war. See id. at 16.
15 For example, a patient who wins a substantial monetary award may not feel
vindicated if all he really wanted was for the doctor to look him in the eye and apologize.
For further examples, see Sheila M. Johnson, A Medical Malpractice Litigator Proposes
Mediation, 52 Disp. RESOL. J. 42 (1997).
16 See FURROw ET AL., supra note 1, at 336.
17 The Hand formula finds negligence if the probability of the loss occurring,
multiplied by the damages resulting from such a loss, is greater than the cost of preventing
the loss [(probability of the loss) x (damage) > (cost of preventing the loss)]. Thus, for
example, if the probability of an accident at a railroad crossing is high, and the cost of
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far too complex for this simple formula.' 8 Another problem with the ability
of tort litigation to deter medical negligence is the fact that doctors do not
understand tort law. To deter negligent conduct, tort law presumes that
doctors understand the legal system and assess negligence using the same
standards as juries.19 This presumption is, however, highly questionable. 20
Yet another problem is the perception among doctors that the filing of a
lawsuit is not necessarily correlated to an incident of malpractice. Doctors
tend to believe that malpractice lawsuits are filed arbitrarily and that the best
protection against a lawsuit is to be nice to the patients.21 Some authors have
attempted to defend medical malpractice litigation by focusing on the results
of certain types of malpractice claims, but these defenses miss the point.22 The
point is that most doctors believe the decision to file a claim in the first place
is based on factors other than the claim's merits. This perception prevents
litigation from effectively deterring negligent conduct because doctors have
erecting a sign that would prevent such an accident is low, then it is negligent not to erect
the sign. In this example the negligent conduct is both easily identifiable and correctable.
See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
18 Given the wide range of legitimate treatment decisions for a particular condition,
the sheer number of decisions made in the course of treating a patient, and the individuality
of each patient, it may be impossible to identify conduct that is "negligent."
19 See Bryan A. Liang, Medical Malpractice: Do Physicians Have Knowledge of Legal
Standards and Assess Cases as Juries Do?, 3 U. Cm. L. ScI. RouNmABLE 68-70 (1996).
20 Liang found that most of the doctors in his study obtained information on
malpractice from the press and that "no physician reported reading the common law on
malpractice cases, or even knowing what the common law was." Id. at 65; see also
Johnson, supra note 15, at 51 ("[N]othing in medical school... prepares physicians for
negotiating their way through the legal system.... They learn nothing in medical school
about law.").
21 Obviously, such suspicions are difficult, if not impossible, to confirm, but the
perception nonetheless exists.
22 For example, one study concluded that in closed claims for anesthesia-related
injuries, 80% of the successful claims based on a theory of substandard care generated
compensation for patients. See Frederick Cheney et al., Standard of Care and Anesthesia
Liability, 261 JAMA 1599, 1601 (1989). This study simply does not address the concern
that the claims themselves may have been filed arbitrarily. Other studies indicate that juries
in medical malpractice cases act fairly, see, e.g., NEiL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
AND TnE AMERICAN JURY: CONRONTMNG aE MYTHs ABoUT JuRY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP
POCKETS, AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS 265 (1995), but again these studies only
focus on claims that have already been filed.
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no confidence that negligent conduct will in fact result in a lawsuit.23 Further,
the current system may cause doctors to engage in the practice of defensive
medicine. 24 Far from deterring negligence, defensive medicine may actually
expose patients to unnecessary risks.
One final problem with medical malpractice litigation is that it does not
encourage patients who have actually suffered injury through medical
negligence to bring their claims. Patients are uneducated about their rights and
the legal system in general, but even when they do know their rights, they
may be discouraged from pursuing medical malpractice claims because the
financial and emotional costs are too high. As mentioned above, recent studies
have concluded that an incredibly small percentage of patients with
meritorious malpractice claims actually file lawsuits. 25 Other studies have
concluded that the current litigation system undercompensates patients with
minor injuries and overcompensates patients with major injuries. 26
1l. BAD MEDICINE: MISGUIDED ATTEMPTS TO REFORM THE SYSTEM
In an attempt to address the problems of medical malpractice litigation,
some states have passed tort reform legislation. Other states have attempted
to use alternative dispute resolution. However, none of these reforms
adequately addresses the problems with the current tort litigation system.
Some commentators have advocated abandoning the current system entirely
in favor of new theories of recovery. Although most of these theories have
23 One more important factor that seems to be overlooked in the deterrence issue is
the degree to which physician negligence is limited through self-control. It is likely that a
doctor's personal remorse and professional embarrassment, not the threat of a lawsuit, is
the most effective deterrent of physician negligence.
24 Defensive medicine occurs when a doctor performs an unnecessary procedure
mainly to avoid liability for negligence. Although the actual rate of defensive medicine is
difficult to measure, one author estimates that defensive medicine may cost the nation's
health care system as much as $15 billion a year. See Armand Leone, Jr., As Health Care
Enterprise Liability Expands... Is ADR the Rxfor Malpractice?, Disp. RESOL. J., Sept.
1994, at 10. Regardless of the difficulty of measuring the rate of defensive medicine, it can
hardly be doubted that legal liability constantly influences doctors' treatment decisions.
25 See DANZON, supra note 4, at 10; Localio et al., supra note 4, at 248; see also
LoRea I. Hoycke & Mark M. Hoycke, Characteristics of Potential Plaintiffs in Malpractice
Litigation, 120 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 792, 796 (1994) (finding from a survey of six
law firms in five states that only one out of every thirty calls to the office regarding medical
malpractice resulted in the filing of a lawsuit).
26 See WEILER, supra note 3, at 53, 54.
912
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merit, this Note argues that such wholesale changes to the current system are
both risky and unnecessary.
A. State Reforms
1. Tort Reform Legislation
Many states have passed tort reform legislation targeted at controlling
medical malpractice claims. 27 The problem with tort reform legislation is that
the purpose of such legislation is not to increase access to compensation for
injured patients or to create a fair dispute resolution system for medical
malpractice claims, but rather to decrease the number and size of medical
malpractice claims. 28 Typical tort reform legislation decreases the frequency
of lawsuits by shortening statutes of limitations, controlling legal fees, and
providing for reimbursement to defendants for frivolous claims.29 Recovery
amounts can be limited by mandating periodic payments for long-term
sufferers, eliminating the collateral source rule, and capping damage awards.
30
Apparently, states that pass tort reform legislation believe that a ninety percent
rate of denial of compensation to injured patients is too low.
2. Arbitration and "Mediation"
Many commentators have advocated the use of alternative dispute
resolution to resolve medical malpractice disputes. 31 Some states have actually
instituted programs that purportedly use ADR to resolve medical malpractice
disputes. Unfortunately, all of these attempts have suffered from either poor
conception or poor execution. For example, in California the managed care
27 See FURRow ET AL., supra note 1, at 317-319.
28 Tort reform legislation is typically supported by insurance companies, which
believe that tighter controls on medical malpractice claims will improve the malpractice
liability insurance market. See id.
29 See id.
30 See id.
31 See, e.g., Patricia I. Carter, Binding Arbitration in Malpractice Disputes: The Right
Prescription for HMO Patients?, 18 HAM= J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 423, 424 (1997);
Johnson, supra note 15, at 43; Leone, supra note 24, at 10-12; Reeves, supra note 7, at
16-20; Carl M. Stevens, The Benefits of ADR for Medical Malpractice: Adopting Contract
Rather than Tort Cases, Disp. RESOL. J., Apr./June 1995, at 65, 65.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
giant Kaiser Permanente instituted a system of mandatory, binding arbitration
for patients who filed malpractice claims. 32 However, the system was so
adversarial and biased in favor of Kaiser that a California court called the
system "unconscionable. 33
Other states have attempted to use mediation to resolve medical
malpractice disputes. However, none of the mediation programs instituted by
these states resembles "mediation" as practiced by ADR professionals, and
generally these attempts have met little success. 34 A legitimate attempt would
probably encompass the following four main principles of mediation: self-
determination, impartiality, fairness, and confidentiality. 35 Unfortunately,
current attempts at mediation do not appear to pursue these principles. As a
result of these poor attempts at mediation, many legal practitioners believe that
mediation of medical malpractice disputes simply does not work.36
B. New Theories of Recovery
In an attempt to address the problems of medical malpractice litigation,
some commentators have suggested new theories of recovery, such as no-fault
liability, enterprise liability, and contract law. Although most of these ideas
have merit, each would necessitate wholesale changes to the current system,
and the actual impact of these theories would be difficult to predict.
32 See Carter, supra note 31, at 427.
33 Id. at 435 (citing Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621, 624
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995)).
34 See, e.g., Jessica Fonseca-Nader, Florida's Comprehensive Medical Malpractice
Reform Act: Is It Time for a Change?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 551, 556 (1996) (describing
Florida's program); Johnson, supra note 15, at 45 (describing Michigan's and Wisconsin's
programs). Michigan's program, for example, involves the evaluation of a malpractice
claim by a panel of five people, none of whom have formal training in mediation. The
parties do not even attend the evaluation session. The panel recommends a settlement
award, which can be rejected by either party. If the award is rejected, the rejecting party
must improve his position at trial by at least 10% or he will be sanctioned. See Johnson,
supra note 15, at 45, 46. Michigan's "mediation" panel is typical of those in other states,
which also bear few characteristics of proper mediation. See, e.g., Fonseca-Nader, supra,
at 557; Johnson, supra note 15, at 46.
35 See Johnson, supra note 15, at 50-51 for a more thorough discussion of these
principles in the context of medical malpractice disputes.
36 See id. at 46.
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1. No-Fault Liability
One theory that is popularly suggested as an alternative to traditional tort
liability is no-fault liability. 37 A no-fault system eliminates negligence as a
condition of compensation for injury. Proponents of a no-fault system for
medical injury assert that such a system would compensate far more patients
who are injured by a doctor's negligence than the current tort system-and at
much lower cost.38 However, because negligence is not a factor in a no-fault
system, such a system also compensates patients who are not the victims of
medical negligence. Thus, a no-fault system does not act as a deterrent of
negligent conduct. 39 Another concern about a no-fault system for medical
injury is that the cost of compensating such a larger pool of claimants would
render such a system cost prohibitive.40
Perhaps most importantly, precious little empirical information exists that
could help predict the societal impact of a complete transition from tort
liability to no-fault liability.41 Some authors have studied no-fault systems that
are extremely limited in scope,42 while other authors have examined broad no-
fault systems in other countries. 43 However useful such studies may be, they
37 See generally Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Administrative Performance of "No-
Fault" Compensation for Medical Injury, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBs., Spring 1997, at 71;
Frank A. Sloan et al., The Road from Medical Injury to Claims Resolution: How No-Fault
and Tort Differ, LAW & CoNTEM. PRoBs., Spring 1997, at 35; David M. Studdert et al.,
Can the United States Afford a "No-Fault" System of Compensation for Medical Injury?,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1997, at 1.
38 See Studdert et al., supra note 37, at 3.
39 In the area of automobile accident liability, where no-fault has been adopted by
some states, the evidence suggests that no-fault actually increases the rate of automobile
fatalities. See Frank A. Sloan, Automobile Accidents, Insurance, and Tort Liability, in 1
THE NEW PALGRAvE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 140, 142-143 (Peter
Newman ed., 1998).
40 See Studdert et al., supra note 37, at 2.
41 See Jerry L. Mashaw & Theodore R. Marmor, Conceptualizing, Estimating, and
Reforming Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Healthcare Spending, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 455, 487
(1994) (commenting that "[t]here are currently no good cost estimates for this sort of major
malpractice reform").
42 See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 37, at 73.
43 See Studdert et al., supra note 37, at 3.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
simply cannot accurately predict the effect of a nationwide switch to no-fault
liability for medical malpractice disputes. 44
2. Enterprise Liability
Another theory suggested as a remedy to the current system is the theory
of enterprise liability. To understand this theory, a brief description of
managed care is helpful. Managed care describes a system of health care
delivery in which a patient's health care is coordinated by a group of
providers to optimize cost efficiency. 45 Managed care is important because it
has become a significant force in modem health care delivery, 46 and because
it profoundly affects health care itself. Although many forms of managed care
exist, each is alike in that it prevents doctors from exercising unfettered
discretion over the health care decisions for a patient.47
Under the theory of enterprise liability, medical malpractice liability shifts
from the individual doctor to the managed care organization. 48 This shift, in
effect, immunizes individual doctors from malpractice lawsuits because
patients file claims against the managed care organization rather than against
individual doctors. 49 At first blush, the potential benefits of enterprise liability
44 For example, how can one measure the certain resistance to such a shift in the
status quo by the courts and the bars? Admirably, one set of authors admits to the limited
utility of their study by stating that "the precise findings of this data-based study of two
small programs seem unlikely to be precisely replicated." Bovbjerg et al., supra note 37,
at 106.
45 Managed care systems developed as a market-driven response to rapidly increasing
health care costs. See Tracy E. Miller, Managed Care Regulation: In the Laboratory of the
States, 278 JAMA 1102, 1102 (1997). Managed care cuts costs by providing financial
incentives to limit treatment and by relying on primary care doctors as "gatekeepers" for
specialty services. See Eve A. Kerr et al., Primary Care Physicians' Satisfaction with
Quality of Care in California Capitated Medical Groups, 278 JAMA 308, 308 (1997).
46 According to one recent study, nearly 80% of the primary care physicians in the
United States have at least one managed care contract, and approximately 42% are
employees of some managed care organization. See Phillip R. Kletke et al., Current Trends
in Physicians'Practice Arrangements: From Owners to Employees, 276 JAMA 555 (1996).
47 Common managed care organizations include the health maintenance organization
(HMO), the independent practice association (IPA), and the preferred provider organization
(PPO). These integrated delivery systems act as both insurers and providers at the same
time. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 1, at 284.
48 See Leone, supra note 24, at 7.
49 See id.
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are apparent. By consolidating liability into a single entity, the ability to
predict claims and losses and price malpractice insurance could improve,
doctors could avoid the emotional stress of a personal lawsuit, managed care
organizations would have an incentive to institute quality control measures,
and plaintiffs' trial costs could be lower. 50
Although enterprise liability offers substantial possible benefits, it also
suffers from both theoretical and practical problems. First, because enterprise
liability retains traditional tort theory as a basis of recovery, it also retains the
problems associated with tort theory. Namely, if tort litigation is generally an
ineffective method of deterring physician negligence or improving health care
quality, why should substituting one defendant for another make a difference?
Second, attempts to impose enterprise liability on managed care organizations
typically run head-first into the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974. 51 Thus, even if enterprise liability theoretically could alleviate the
problems of medical malpractice litigation, effective implementation of such
a system would require massive reform of existing laws. 52
3. Contract Law
Yet another group of commentators has advocated a switch from tort law
altogether to contract law. Traditionally, malpractice claims have been
resolved under tort law, even though an implied contract exists in the doctor-
patient relationship. 53 Today, most doctor-patient relationships exist within the
context of a managed care plan, in which an explicit contract stipulates a
range of health services to be provided at a specific cost.54 The existence of
an explicit contract establishes, obviously, an incentive to resolve malpractice
50 See Sage, supra note 2, at 166.
51 See id. at 180. The Employee Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-
1461), preempts many personal injury claims brought against employers, including claims
brought against entities that act at the direction of employers, such as employer-provided
health insurance organizations. Preemption means that plaintiffs must bring suits in federal
court, where the right to a jury trial may not be guaranteed and the maximum potential
recovery may be much lower than in state court. See Sage, supra note 2, at 180.
52 Indeed, Sage finally concludes that the only way to effectively implement enterprise
liability is through comprehensive, national health reform legislation. See id. at 206.
53 See Stevens, supra note 31, at 66; see also Carter, supra note 31, at 426.
54 See Stevens, supra note 31, at 66.
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disputes under contract law. Advocates of the use of contract law to resolve
medical malpractice disputes assert that such a system would clarify the duties
of health care providers and foster development of efficient methods to resolve
health care disputes. 55 However, the use of contract law to resolve medical
malpractice disputes raises many potential problems. 56
First, how would contract law handle the issue of nonpaying patients, such
as infants or indigents?57 That is, could a health care "contract" exist in the
absence of consideration by one party? Also, the very nature of medical
malpractice-unforeseen incidents-is precisely what contract law is ill
equipped to handle. 58 Next, contract law works best when the parties have
equal bargaining power, a factor that is anything but assured in a health care
contract.59 Finally, there is little evidence that switching to contract law would
itself alleviate the problems of medical malpractice litigation. 60
Other theories of recovery have been advocated, such as the use of a tort-
based implied warranty of quality for managed care organizations, 61 but such
theories generate the same potential problems as the ones described above.
Such reforms involve major changes to the existing system, and little empirical
evidence exists suggesting that the reforms could alleviate the problems
currently facing the system.
55 For example, rather than relying on Learned Hand's negligence equation, managed
care members and organizations could negotiate particular terms into the health care
contract as a means of spreading the costs of accident prevention. See id.
56 One potential problem with the use of contract theory, of course, is that injured
patients might be limited to expectancy damages, rather than the plaintiff-friendly damage
limits of tort law.
57 See P.S. Atiyah, Medical Malpractice and the Contract/Tort Boundary, LAW &
CoNTEmp. PROBs., Spring 1996, at 287, 293.
58 See id. at 294.
59 Indeed, the most frequent consumers of medical care are typically the weakest
members of society. See id. at 295.
60 That is, the health care contract would probably simply specify the tort standard of
reasonable care as the standard for determining whether a contract breach had occurred.
See id. at 299.
61 See William S. Brewbaker III, Medical Malpractice and Managed Care
Organizations: The Implied Warranty of Quality, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs., Spring 1997,
at 117, 118.
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IV. MEDIATION IN THEORY
Despite the ill-conceived attempts at the use of ADR to resolve medical
malpractice disputes, mediation still holds great promise as a method of
resolving these disputes. Mediation is a facilitated negotiation in which parties
discuss their dispute with the help of a neutral third party, whose role is to
help the parties communicate with one another. 62 A mediator has no authority
to impose a resolution; he is primarily concerned with guiding the parties to
a voluntary and mutually acceptable settlement. 63 The theoretical arguments
in favor of the use of mediation to resolve medical malpractice disputes are
discussed below.
A. The Benefits of Mediation in General
As a general matter, mediation has several advantages over litigation.
First, the costs associated with mediation generally are lower than those with
litigation. Disputes are typically resolved much faster in mediation than in
litigation, and thus attorneys' fees and other out-of-pocket expenses are
reduced.64 Mediation, with its emphasis on cooperation and conciliation, also
does not exact as harsh an emotional toll on the parties as does litigation.
A second way in which mediation outperforms litigation relates to the
overall satisfaction of the parties with the resolution process. Satisfaction
depends on the parties' sense of fairness, which in turn is determined by the
opportunity to express oneself, participation in shaping a settlement, and
control over final decisions.65 Mediation, by its nature, allows parties to
express themselves, to contribute significantly to any settlement agreement,
and to have ultimate control over final decisions.i6
62 See KuMmu_ K. KovAcH, MEDIATION PRINCIPis AND PRACTICE 16-17 (1994).
63 See id.; see also CHRISrOPER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL
STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING DIsPUTEs 15 (1986).
64 See, e.g., William A. Quinby, Why Health Care Parties Should Mediate Rather
than Litigate, HEALTHSPAN, Jan. 1994, at 13.
65 See Reeves, supra note 7, at 15.
66 Although litigation does not entirely prohibit these factors of fairness, there is little
doubt that mediation outperforms litigation in its ability to promote these factors.
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B. The Benefits of Mediation Within the Context of the Doctor-Patient
Relationship
To appreciate mediation's utility in the area of medical malpractice, it is
helpful to discuss the importance of the doctor-patient relationship. For many
people, the doctor-patient relationship is as highly personal as relationships
with family or clergy. Also, most patients experience emotional suffering in
addition to their physical ailment when they visit a doctor. A patient worries
about the outcome of his treatment, the possibility of discomfort, the impact
of the situation on his family, and the cost of treatment. 67 Patients, who
generally have little or no understanding of medicine, often give doctors
significant control over treatment decisions. This relinquishment of control
places doctors in positions of extreme trust.
In contrast, doctors know that medicine is often more like an art than a
science and that nothing is absolute. They know that even when the highest
standard of care is given, mistakes or unexpected results may occur. 68
Additionally, doctors have to consider issues beyond merely the patient's
needs, such as billing, insurance, and relationships with other doctors. 69
Patients tend to approach the doctor-patient relationship subjectively, but
doctors tend to approach the relationship objectively. A patient has a physical
illness and anxieties; a doctor has the scientific method. This dichotomy can
lead to problems with communication. 70 Patients can feel threatened,
confused, or abandoned by doctors who do not communicate clearly. 71
Patients may also misinterpret a doctor's businesslike demeanor as a lack of
caring. 72 Doctors, who sincerely believe that they make the best treatment
decisions for their patients, do not want to burden patients with complicated
terminology and consequently may contribute to the communication problem
by not disclosing enough information.73 When communication is poor,
67 See Ann J. Kellet, Healing Angry Wounds: The Roles of Apology and Mediation in
Disputes Between Physicians and Patients, 1987 J. DIsP. REsoL. 111, 114.
68 See Reeves, supra note 7, at 14.
69 See id.
70 See id. at 15.
71 See Kellet, supra note 67, at 123.
72 See id. at 121.
73 See id. at 118.
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mistrust increases, and patients search for problems where none may actually
exist.74
Mediation would outperform litigation in its ability to maintain the doctor-
patient relationship. 75 Although medical negligence will likely sever the
doctor-patient relationship no matter how the dispute is resolved, mediation
at least gives that relationship some chance to continue.76 This is important
because managed care organizations are extremely interested in maintaining
doctor-patient relationships. Managed care organizations that contract with
large employers, for example, risk losing many members if patients are
unhappy with their doctors.77
Mediation also outperforms litigation in its ability to resolve the "real"
issues. Litigation tends to focus on monetary liability and blame. However,
the potential damage award amount is often not of paramount concern for an
injured patient.78 Hardened litigators may forget that many disputes can be
resolved by simply having the parties talk to each other. Because mediation
allows the parties to express their feelings openly, the doctor and the patient
are more likely to feel that the real issues have been resolved. 79
C. Potential Problems of Mediation
Although many commentators have advocated the use of mediation to
resolve medical malpractice disputes, few case studies have been undertaken
to measure or predict mediation's effectiveness in this area. Thus, very little
74 See id. at 122.
75 
"Mediation is an appropriate process where the parties wish to preserve an on-going
relationship or to terminate an existing relationship in the least adversarial way." 5A OHIo
JuR. 3D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 11 (1997).
76 See Carter, supra note 31, at 445.
77 Managed care organizations try to maintain relationships with members, even when
there is a dispute between a member and an individual physician. See Leone, supra note
24, at 10.
78 In a typical medical malpractice dispute, an injured patient feels confused and
betrayed and may simply want the doctor to explain why something went wrong or to
apologize. See Catherine S. Meschievitz, Mediation and Medical Malpractice: Problems
with Definition and Implementation, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1991, at 200.
79 Sheila Johnson relates the following story about a client (an injured patient): "My
client has repeatedly said to me, 'I just want to ask [the doctor] why she treated me that
way.' . . . I also got the impression... that [the doctor] also wants to explain her actions
very much." Johnson, supra note 15, at 49.
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empirical evidence exists regarding the effectiveness of mediation as a method
of resolving medical malpractice disputes. Part of the problem is that due to
the failed attempts at the use of mediation described above, lawyers hold many
misconceptions about mediation's effectiveness. Among the common
misconceptions are the following: (1) patients are not compensated as
generously in mediation as they are in litigation, (2) patients will be
intimidated into prematurely settling meritorious claims during mediation, and
(3) mediation simply prolongs the dispute process by delaying the real
resolution process-litigation. The goal of the next part of this Note is to
dispel some of the misconceptions about mediation by examining actual case
studies of the use of mediation.
V. MEDIATION IN PRACTICE
At least two case studies have recently been conducted which strongly
suggest that mediation actually can alleviate many of the problems associated
with the medical malpractice litigation system. The first study was conducted
by Douglas Henderson, a construction law practitioner, who examined the
effectiveness of mediation in over five hundred construction disputes.8 0 The
second study, conducted by two professors of economics-Henry S. Farber
and Michelle J. White-evaluated several hundred medical malpractice cases
brought at a hospital that provides a voluntary, informal dispute resolution
procedure. 81
A. The Henderson Study
Although the Henderson study examined mediation in the context of
construction disputes, the goal of the Henderson study was to develop answers
to several common questions regarding the effectiveness of mediation in
general by examining the "determinants of mediation success across a wide
range of dispute fact patterns, case situations, and mediator abilities and
80 See generally Douglas A. Henderson, Mediation Success: An Empirical Analysis,
11 OMO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 105 (1996). The disputes examined in the Henderson study
ranged in amount in controversy from $600 to $100 million, and in number of parties from
2 to 70. See id. at 141. Most disputes involved more than two issues. See id. Mediations
that ended in fall settlement were considered successful. See id. at 136-137.
81 See generally Henry S. Farber & Michelle J. White, A Comparison of Formal and
Informal Dispute Resolution in Medical Malpractice, 23 J. LEGAL STuD. 777 (1994).
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innovations." 82 Henderson's conclusions are extremely interesting. For
example, Henderson concludes that relatively few factors have a strong impact
on the final outcome of mediation. The factors that do have a strong impact
all relate to the mediation process itself, as opposed to mediator skills or the
substantive nature of the dispute.83
Henderson's results are important because they dispel many
misconceptions about mediation. First, Henderson found that successful
mediation takes time. Specifically, the mediations that lasted two or more days
were ninety-five percent more likely to settle than the ones that did not last
that long. 84 Second, Henderson found that the type of dispute, the number of
issues, and the number of parties each had no discernible effect on mediation
outcome.8 5 Third, although no one specific tactic used by the mediator was
related to mediation success, diversity of tactics was very important. That is,
when a mediator uses two or more specific mediation tactics, settlement is
nearly twice as likely to occur.86 Fourth, very interestingly, "the source of
mediation rules used ... was, by far, the best predictor of mediation
settlement." 87 Specifically, settlement was much more likely to occur if the
parties developed their own mediation rules, as opposed to using rules
developed by an institution such as the American Arbitration Association or
the Center for Public Resources.8 8 Fifth, settlement was much more likely if
some discovery (not necessarily full discovery) occurred before mediation. 89
Finally, whether mediation was forced or voluntary had no significant impact
on mediation outcome.90
The Henderson study is relevant, then, because it demonstrates that
mediation can effectively resolve disputes involving large amounts in
controversy, multiple parties, and multiple issues. As is the case with
construction industry disputes, medical malpractice disputes often involve
82 Henderson, supra note 80, at 106. The study examined whether the following
factors affected mediation success: amount in controversy, number of issues, number of
parties, theory of the case (i.e., tort versus contract), mediator skill, and mediator tactics.
83 See id. at 107.
84 See id. at 143.
85 See id. at 144.
86 See id.
87 Id. at 145.
88 See id.
89 See id. at 145-146.
90 See id. at 146.
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large amounts in controversy, multiple parties, and multiple issues. Although
comparisons between construction disputes and medical malpractice should be
made cautiously, 91 the results of the Henderson study have obvious
implications in the area of medical malpractice. However, even stronger proof
of the utility of ADR to resolve medical malpractice disputes can be found in
the Farber and White study, discussed below.
B. The Farber and White Study
Farber and White examined several hundred medical malpractice cases
involving a hospital that offered a voluntary, informal complaints process to
patients. 92 The study compared the experiences of patients who began the
dispute resolution process in two different manners: those who filed a lawsuit
and those who began the process by filing a complaint with the hospital's
informal dispute resolution office. The goal of the study was to determine
whether lawsuit-based disputes differed from complaint-based disputes in
terms of the following: how the case was resolved, settlement amount, and
quality of care (based on assessments by the hospital's experts). 93
The results of the Farber and White study suggest that ADR can be an
effective tool to resolve medical malpractice disputes fairly. For example, the
complaint process costs the hospital about $200 on average, as compared with
$31,000 to defend a lawsuit that was tried to a verdict. 94 Also, about half of
the complaint-based disputes were resolved without the filing of a lawsuit. 95
Of the 465 cases that either began as or became lawsuits, only 26 were tried
to a verdict. Of these, plaintiffs won only four cases. Interestingly, three of
91 For example, the relative bargaining strengths and knowledge of issues between
parties to a construction dispute may be quite different than those between parties to a
medical malpractice dispute.
92 The alternative dispute resolution system offered by the hospital in the Farber and
White study is even less formal than mediation. No lawyers are involved; rather, plaintiffs
represent themselves, and the hospital is represented by an in-house complaints staff. The
process is actually a prelitigation measure designed to encourage early settlement of
disputes before lawsuits are even filed. See Farber & White, supra note 81, at 779.
93 See id. at 787. Patients who utilized the informal complaint process were at all
times free to file a lawsuit. See id. at 785.
94 See id. at 778. Additionally, the average cost to the hospital to defend a lawsuit that
settled was $14,000, and the cost to defend a lawsuit that was dropped was $7000! See id.
95 See id. at 788.
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the four lawsuits won by plaintiffs began as informal complaints. 96 Although
only fifteen percent of the cases tried to a verdict were won by plaintiffs, the
hospital's experts determined that about forty-two percent of the cases tried to
a verdict involved poor quality care. 97 Farber and White also determined that
the manner by which a case was resolved (that is, whether it was dropped,
settled, or tried to a verdict) did not depend on whether the case began as a
complaint or a lawsuit. 98 However, settlement amounts at the complaint stage
were about one-third as much as settlement amounts at the lawsuit stage. 99
Farber and White concluded that the informal complaint process was a
cost-effective way to facilitate the flow of information between the hospital
and the patients. 100 Further, the authors speculated that if the hospital's
informal complaint process were mandatory, the total savings in legal costs for
both the hospital and patients would exceed five million dollars annually. 101
VI. CONCLUSION
It is almost universally agreed that the current tort-based litigation system
is an ineffective method of resolving medical malpractice disputes. Tort-based
litigation fails to compensate injured patients, to deter physician negligence,
or to provide a dispute resolution system that is fair to all parties. However,
the purpose of most reforms instituted by states has been to further decrease
injured patients' access to the legal system. In an attempt to devise a system
that compensates injured patients, deters physician negligence, and is fair,
some commentators have advocated wholesale changes to medical malpractice
96 See id. at 802. In addition, the fourth case won by a plaintiff began as a hospital
incident report, not as a patient-initiated lawsuit. See id.
97 Thus, litigation did not effectively compensate patients injured through medical
negligence.
98 See id. at 797.
99 See id. at 799. This result carries two important caveats. First, lawsuit settlement
amounts did not depend on whether the cases originated as lawsuits or complaints. Second,
the lower settlement amounts at the complaint stage may actually have put more money in
the patients' hands, considering the amount of money the patients saved by not going to
trial.
100 See id. at 806. That is, the hospital and the patients received the same type of
information about each other that they would have in litigation but at much lower cost. See
id.
101 See id. at 804.
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recovery theory. Unfortunately, it is difficult to predict whether these changes
could actually alleviate the problems of the current system, and it is unlikely
that such fundamental shifts in legal theory would be easily instituted. Finally,
some states have attempted to use alternative dispute resolution, but most of
these attempts have been disastrously conceived and executed.
The best solution to the problems of the current medical malpractice
system is to institute a program similar to the one used by the hospital in the
Farber and White study. That is, the system should provide mediation ("true"
mediation) as a first step in the malpractice dispute process. This simple step
would increase compensation to injured patients because patients would
cheaply and quickly gain access to the legal system. Yet, hospitals would
dispose of claims much faster and at much lower cost. Moreover, this system
would improve quality of care because mediation encourages the flow of
information between doctors and patients. 0 2 The system would also be more
fair than the current one because the parties would have a chance to arrive at
a mutually satisfactory resolution before advancing to an adversarial lawsuit.
The use of mediation as a first step in the medical malpractice dispute
process would also be very easy to implement. First, the cost of running a
mediation program is relatively low. Second, the legal community would be
much more likely to accept a reform that does not involve wholesale changes
in the theory of recovery. Finally, alternative dispute resolution is enjoying
ever-increasing popularity, especially in the area of health care. For example,
every health care reform bill that has recently come before Congress has
included some provision encouraging the use of ADR to resolve health care
disputes. 103 In addition, in August 1998, a Commission on Health Care
Dispute Resolution, comprised of the American Arbitration Association,
American Bar Association, and American Medical Association, established
ground rules for the use of ADR to resolve health care disputes in the
managed care environment. 104 Thus, it appears that the time is ripe to add a
spoonful of mediation to the medical malpractice dispute process.
102 Doctors, therefore, could gain insights they might otherwise not.
103 See generally William T. D'Zurilla, Federal Health Care Bills Include ADR, 41
LA. B.J. 560 (1994).
104 See Rules for Dispute Resolution, AM. MED. NEws, Sept. 7, 1998, at 30.
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